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INTRODUCTION
Governments  are paying increasing attention to the management of their public pension
fund reserves. Rather than cutting benefits or increasing contributions to enlarge these
reserves, they are focusing on the more politically  appealing alternative of improving
their investment performance  (Palacios 2002). They are, however, facing growing
pressure to use these funds to improve the local economy or achieve other social goals,
and such use obviously can have a significant negative impact on investment
performance.  There consequently is a strong need for public pension reform to focus  on
the governance  structures and practices of these funds.
There is extensive research on the governance of corporations.  The field of corporate
governance  generally is concerned with the basic issue of instilling investors with the
confidence that will permit them to hand over their money to managers. As noted by
Davis and Useem (2000), corporate  governance deals with the basic issue of "the ways in
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their
investment" (Shleifer and Vishny 1997:  737), as well as the broader cultural and
institutional arrangements  affecting the governance of firms. Over the past two decades,
corporate governance has become a leading topic of discussion for researchers  in finance,
management,  and law. Their goal is to find the optimal organizational  arrangements to
both protect shareholders'  rights and at the same time increase  economic efficiency.
A leading theory used to analyze corporate governance and provide prescriptions  on
govemance  structures and incentives  is the agency theory. This paper examines the
applicability of such theory to the governance of public pension  funds. Section I
discusses the application of agency theory to corporations. Included in this discussion is
the problem of the separation of ownership  and control, where certain inefficiencies  result
when those making the decisions for the organization do not fully bear the risks of those
decisions.  Corporations use various mechanisms  to attempt to control these problems.
Section II discusses the agency problems that may exist in public pensions. Section III
provides an analysis of the control of agency problems that impact the management of
pension funds, and demonstrates  the need for a strong, well-functioning board of trustees.
Section IV discusses the implications of using behavioral controls  (as opposed to
outcome controls) to solve agency problems associated with the structure and functioning
of the board of trustees.  This section also presents the results of a survey of governance
26 public pension funds from various countries.  Conclusions follow in Section V.
I  AGENCY THEORY AND CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE
l.A  Agency Problems: Separation of Ownership and Control
and Moral Hazard Problems
Agency theory deals with the problems that can arise when one person (an agent) acts on
behalf of another (the principal). Specifically,  the delegation of authority to the agent may
result in the agent taking actions that are not in the principal's best interests (i.e., that are
acts of self-interest on the part of the agent) but which are unknown to the principal. The
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goals of agency theory are to constrain agents from acting improperly and to provide
them with incentives to act appropriately.
In the context of the corporation,  agency theorists view the firm as a "nexus of contracts"
between shareholders, managers,  and other stakeholders.  These parties each may have
conflicts of interests with the other contracting parties. For example, if a manager owned
100 percent of a firm's equity there would be no conflict of interest, as the manager
would receive all the benefits of his or her efforts and would bear all the costs of any
shirking or opportunistic behavior (Jensen and Meckling  1976). As the manager's
fraction of the equity declines, the manager is more likely to "appropriate  perquisites out
of the firm's resources,"  and the manager's "incentive to devote significant effort to
creative activities such as searching out new profitable ventures falls" (Jensen and
Meckling  1976). When the manager's ownership moves toward zero percent of the
corporation's  equity, significant agency problems can result. This is the basic problem of
separating ownership from control that dominates discussions of U.S. corporate law and
finance-those making the decisions  do not bear the full wealth consequences  of their
actions.
It should be noted that the problem of separation of ownership (the shareholders)  from
control (management)  is rare outside of the United States and the United Kingdom. In
other countries, corporations typically are owned by majority shareholders  (Davis and
Useem 2000). While such shareholders may take actions for their own benefit and to the
detriment of minority shareholders,  the presumption is that large shareholders  work
toward the increase of share value, and this is to the benefit of all shareholders.  When
control is exercised by small minority shareholders (management)  the same presumption
cannot safely be defended,  for the reason that minority shareholders may receive more
value from actions that provide a personal benefit at the expense of share value.
In addition to the issue of the separation of ownership from control, there are other
problems that can afflict any type of agency relationship. These can result from
uncertainty and goal conflict or from an inability to write a contract that fully specifies
the behavior of the agent in all situations (Levinthal  1988).  With respect to uncertainty,
agency theorists have identified two categories of problem. First, there is the moral
hazard problem, which involves an agent failing to exert the necessary effort to
satisfactorily perform his or her job (shirking) or taking actions that benefit himself or
herself at the expense of the principal (opportunism).  These problems result from a lack
of monitoring or ineffective incentives.  Second, there is the adverse selection problem,
arising when an agent lacks the competence  to perform the job. This results from an
inability or failure of the principal to verify the claimed skills of the agent.
The goal conflict problem results when the principal and the agent have different goals
and it is difficult (and/or expensive) for the principal to monitor the agent's behavior (to
ensure appropriate behavior) (Eisenhardt  1989). The source of the conflict can be the
self-interest of the agent or simply, different attitudes toward risk. Where the goals of the
agent and principal do not conflict, uncertainty is not an issue as the principal can rely on
the agent to act in furtherance of their shared goals.
A fundamental assumption of agency theory is that individuals are self-interested and will
act on that self-interest; that is, they are opportunistic.  Whenever there is a conflict
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between the interests of the agent and the principal, the agent thus can be expected to act
in his or her own self-interest. For exarnple,  in publicly held corporations,  managers (the
agents) are contractually bound to work in the shareholders'  (the principal's) best
interests, but if they know that they will not be monitored nor therefore potentially
punished they may exert less effort than is appropriate  (shirking) or take advantage of
company resources for their own personal benefit. In such situations an agency problem
will occur whenever management has an incentive to pursue its own interests to the
detriment of shareholder interests.  This is not to say that all managers are opportunistic,
but the threat of opportunism is significant enough that preventative measures must be
taken.
LB  Resolving Problems
l.B.1  Behavioral versus Outcome  Controls
The goal of agency theory is to find the most cost-effective governance mechanisms to
solve any existing or potential agency problems. Governance mechanisms  are generally
either behavior-oriented or outcome-oriented  (Eisenhardt 1989).  Behavior-oriented
mechanisms focus on the specific actions of the agent, and include, for example,
infornation systems that allow the principal to monitor the agent's behavior. Outcome-
oriented mechanisms  focus less on the specific actions of the agent and more on the
results the agent achieves.  Such mechanisms include  stock options for managers, thus
rewarding them for achieving the goals of the shareholders (increased share value).
Choosing the appropriate category of governance mechanism to use depends on several
factors, including the amount of goal conflict, the task performed,  the degree of outcome
uncertainty, and the measurability of the outcome (Eisenhardt  1989). The app'ication of
these factors is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Agency  Relationship Characteristics
Risk Aversion  The less risk-averse the agent (compared  to the pincipal), the better It  is to use outcome-
based mechanisms, as such mechanisms  pass risk on to the agent
Outcome Uncertainty  Where various factors beyond the control of the agent can create significant variations in
outcomes (such as govemment  policies or changes in  the general economic climate), using
outcome-based control mechanisms becomes less attractive,  as there is no clear link
between job performance  and organizational performance
Goal Conflict  The less goal conflict there is between  the  principal and agent, the less need there is to
monitor the agent's behavior (as  both  principal and agent are working  toward the same goal).
The choice of mechanisms depends on risk sharing
Task Programmability  Task programmability  is the extent to which the specific behaviors of the agent can be
established in advance. With highly programmed tasks, the behavior of the agent can be
easily monitored  and behavior-based  mechanisms therefore efficientiy used
Measurability of  Where it is diffcult to measure the outcome or the contribution  of each team member to an
Outcome  outcome,  or where the outcome cannot be meaningfully  measured except over a long period
of time, then behavior-based mechanisms may be best
Length of Time of the  With longer-term relationships, the principal is better able to collect informaton about the
Principal-Agent  behavior of the agent and can effectively use behavior-based controls. With short-term
Relationship  relationships and  less Ume to leam  about the abilities of the agent, outcome-based controls
may be more attractive
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I.B.2  Corporate  Governance  Control Mechanisms
Because there are significant benefits to having a specialized managerial group running a
corporation,  certain agency costs can be tolerated.  To mitigate these costs, the corporate
governance  system has various behavioral and outcome-based  control mechanisms.  Some
of these controls are external to the firm and some are internal.
I.B.3  External Controls
The first external control of managerial  behavior is the market for corporate control. If a
corporation is under performing due to poor management, another organization will
recognize the lost value and purchase the corporation from its shareholders.  If
management  does not act in the best interests of shareholders it will thus lose control of
the firm. For this market to work, however, the firm's share price must accurately reflect
the behavior of management.
A second external control is the product (or service) market. If management is not
appropriately doing its job (or is incompetent),  the corporation will fail and go into
bankruptcy.  Competition in the product market thus disciplines management,  especially
where there is also a functioning labor market for top management; that is, managing  a
corporation into bankruptcy will have  a negative effect on a manager's career prospects.
For instance,  fit and proper tests for directors and senior managers often specify that
responsibility positions cannot be covered by directors or senior managers previously
involved in a bankrupt or liquidated company.
A final external control involves monitoring by large shareholders. A shareholder with a
significant interest in the firm has an incentive to expend the resources necessary to
monitor management and also to intervene when necessary. Rather than simply sell their
shares if they disagree with how the firm is being managed, large shareholders have an
interest in improving the firm.
The first two of these mechanisms  are outcome-based controls.  Shareholder monitoring,
although shareholders may push for some outcome-based  controls, is behavioral.
I.B.4  Internal Controls
The board of directors can serve as an information  collection system for the monitoring
of management behavior (Eisenhardt  1989),  and as such has become broadly regarded by
corporate governance activists, scholars,  and practitioners as the best continuous,  cost-
effective monitoring device (Singh and Harianto  1989). For it to fulfill this role, however,
directors must have the proper incentives-just as managers may have a conflict of
interest with shareholders,  so may directors.
In the corporate governance literature  it is common to distinguish between inside and
outside (or independent) directors.  Inside directors  are managers of the firm, while
outside directors have no employment relationship with the firm. Inside directors bring to
the board extensive knowledge of the firm, but they are expected to have a conflict of
interest with shareholders  and through siding with the CEO to provide no protection
against problems of moral hazard. They typically will support the CEO's interests over
those of the shareholders  because the CEO controls the trajectory of their careers within
the firm (Lin 1996).  Outside directors  are generally considered  to be sufficiently
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independent of the CEO to be capable of protecting the rights of those shareholders who
may be harmed by the CEO's behavior.
Boards that include directors that represent all stakeholder groups are uncommon.  While
some corporations in Germany, for example, are required by law to have employee
representatives on the board (typically on a two-tiered board), the ability of these
representatives to protect the rights of their constituents or to influence corporate policy is
not clear. Studies have even suggested that shareholder representatives  may act to
specifically limit the impact of such employee directors; shareholder directors,  for
example, have been known to exclude employee directors from meetings at which
sensitive information is discussed (Becht et al.  2002).
Concerns about the ability of inside directors to perform their role has led corporate
governance reformers to push strongly for a more independent board. The National
Association of Corporate Directors and the Business Roundtable both recornmend that a
board consist of a "substantial majority" of outside directors (Bhagat and Black 1999).
The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), a pension fund active
in corporate governance reforms, even recommends that the only inside director on the
board should be the CEO (Bhagat and Black 1999).
The empirical evidence of the effectiveness  of an independent board in reducing agency
problems nonetheless is ambiguous.  Some commentators argue that it is difficult to
establish a statistical relationship because the board is a poor monitor of management
regardless of its ratio of inside to outside directors. The independence of outside directors
furthermore has been challenged by those who claim that CEOs have significant control
over the selection of board members and will only choose those who are  syrnpathetic to
their view (see Shivdasani and Yermack  1999; Zajac and Westphal 1996; Westphal and
Zajac 1995; Wade et al.  1990).  Other critics argue that any outside directors appointed
with the support of the CEO are unlikely to challenge the CEO's actions (see Lin 1996;
Main et al.  1995; Lorsch and Maclver 1989). Mechanisms  to mitigate against CEO
control of a board include legal and financial incentives to encourage directors to exercise
their own judgment in protecting shareholder interests. The labor market can provide a
similar incentive.
While the board serves as a behavioral control on management, the board's incentives are
outcome-based controls. First, corporation laws create fiduciary obligations, including the
duties of loyalty and care, for directors. The duty of loyalty involves conflicts of interests
and the avoidance of actions that would benefit the director at the expense of
shareholders. The duty of care requires a director to act with good faith and "with the care
that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like
position and under similar circumstances"  (American Law Institute (ALI) Principles,
section 4.01). This requires that a director be well informed on the subject at hand and
that he or she act in the best interests of the corporation.  If directors breach their duties
they may be personally liable for any loses resulting to the corporation.  In the United
States, the incentive effects of liability for directors  are limited to only the most egregious
abuses, as courts are reluctant to second-guess the business decisions of directors even if
they have turned out to be disastrous for the firm.
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A second  form  of incentives for directors is reputation capital. Several scholars have
argued that directors are motivated to fulfill their monitoring role by a concem to protect
their reputation in the labor market (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983b). Directors
develop and maintain their reputations as "experts in decision control" (Fama and Jensen
1983b: 315). During a director's tenure on a board, the company's performance will
determine the director's reputation. If the company performs poorly, the director's
reputation will be tamished. This can lead to the director being offered fewer, or less
prestigious,  board seats in the future (Lin  1996).
Third, directors  are motivated to perform their duties based on their own equity stakes in
the finn. This theory is based on the notion of a "convergence  of interests"  (Lin 1996:
918): that a director who holds equity in a firm and who acts on his or her own financial
interests necessarily also is acting in the interests of other shareholders.
The corporate governance literature in law and financial economics is dominated by
researchers  who have used an agency perspective.  Management  literature researchers
additionally have considered factors such as team dynamics  and organizational  cultures.
For example, one of the few consistent findings from empirical research on boards is that
the greater the number of board members,  the worse the organizational  performance.  In
general, any board with more than 15 or 20 members will likely have a negative impact
on performance.  This finding has held for studies both in the United States and elsewhere
(Davis and Useem 2000). With an increasing number of members, the ability of the board
to work together as a team diminishes and the willingness of a director to be actively
engaged in board activities decreases  (Davis and Useem 2000).
In recognition of the need for smaller workgroups,  it is common to find corporations
using separate committees for matters such as investments, audits, governance,  and
compensation of management.  In the case of a pension fund, the investment committee  is
usually responsible for defining the investment policy of the fund. The audit committee is
usually responsible for oversight of the external auditor, including its qualifications and
independence;  the performance of the corporation's  internal audit function and external
auditors;  and the responsibilities  of senior management  to ensure that an appropriate
system of controls exists to (a) safeguard of the assets and income of the corporation;  (b)
ensure the integrity of the corporation's  financial statements;  and (c) maintain compliance
with the corporation's ethical standards, policies, plans, and procedures and with laws
and regulations. The governance committee usually exercises general oversight with
respect to the governance of the board of directors:  it would review the qualifications of
and recommend proposed nominees to the board and would be responsible for (a)
evaluating and recommending to the board corporate governance practices applicable to
the corporation and (b) leading the board in its annual review of the board's performance.
The compensation  and management  committee usually reviews and approves the
corporation's compensation and benefit programs,  ensures the competitiveness  of  these
programs, and advises the board on the development of and succession for key
executives.
11  AGENCY  PROBLEMS  IN PUBLIC  PENSION  PLANS
This section takes a closer look at public pension funds to determine potential agency
problems. By taking a "nexus of contracts" approach to public pensions we can examine
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what the various stakeholders expect from public pensions and where there are potential
conflicts.  This discussion will also provide insight into who the principals (or "owners")
of the pension plan are.
Il.A  Who Are Public Pension Fund Stakeholders?
To develop an understanding of the appropriate governance structure of public pension
plans it is necessary first to identify the stakeholder groups and their interests. The three
key stakeholder groups relevant to this analysis are the plan participants, the government,
and the taxpayers. The plan participants  group includes active members (the current
contributors), retired members (those currently receiving benefits), and survivors and
dependents of plan participants.  The membership  of this group can be broad or limited,
depending on whether the pension plan is a national scheme or a specific civil service
group. This stakeholder group clearly has the most direct interest in the pension system's
performance (Mitchell  2002). In the United States and the United Kingdom, the law
governing private pension plans requires that the plans be managed solely in the best
interests of participants and beneficiaries. This stakeholder  group has an interest in the
amount of their benefits, in the assurance that they will receive those benefits at a future
date, and in the size of their contributions to the plan.
A second stakeholder  group is the government, which has an interest in the administrative
costs of running the plan and in the performance  of the plan's assets, as these factors
influence the amount of the government's contribution  for DB plans. As an employer (in
the case of civil service plans), the government is interested in the financial health of the
plan for its impact on the ability to recruit new employees and retain existing employees
(Mitchell 2002). In addition, the financial health of the plan can have an impact on pay
and benefit negotiations  with employee representatives.  The government,  however, may
desire to use the plan's assets to further other government objectives, such as making
investments to help the local economy.
Finally, taxpayers are natural stakeholders of any defined benefit (DB) public pension
fund and any defined contribution (DC) scheme with minimum return guarantees.  In a
DB plan, the beneficiary is given set retirement benefits based on a formula that considers
years of employment,  salary, cost of living adjustments, and other factors. The pension
fund sponsor must make sure that the assets of the fund are sufficient to provide for
current and potential liabilities (i.e., the payment of benefits to retirees).  In this situation,
the taxpayer bears the ultimate obligation to maintain adequate funding levels. If a
pension fund obtains sufficient market returns through investment, the government may
lower its contributions to the fund, which means it may directly lower taxes or use those
funds for other projects. If market performance is poor and liabilities exceed assets, the
government will have to use taxpayer money to increase the plan's assets. This will result
in either an increase in taxes or fewer available  funds for other government services.
Funding problems in civil service plans can have other effects for taxpayers: for example,
significantly under funded pension plans can reduce property values, due to the
expectation of future tax increases, or reduce the bond or credit ratings of local
government (Mitchell  2002).David Hess and Gregorio Impavido
II.B  Potential Agency Problems
In the same way that they can create problems for corporations,  goal conflict and
uncertainty can create agency problems for public pension funds. It is useful to consider
two potentially separate problems:  traditional problems based on the direct self-interest of
trustees, such as self-dealing and corruption,  or simply shirking; and problems  based on
the political goals of the trustees, such as the use of pension fund assets to further the
social goals of the governing party. The latter occurs, for example, when the trustees,
without considering the risk-return characteristics of the investment, direct the pension's
assets toward investments that support local businesses and employment.
In the United States, unresolved agency problems based on self-interest often involve
politically motivated actions, commonly when politically appointed or ex officio trustees
make decisions not to further the beneficiaries'  interests but to improve their own
situation. For example, during her campaign for public office a former ex officio trustee
of the New York City pension fund publicized the corporate governance activism in
which she had participated as a trustee of the city pension  fund (Romano 2001  and 1993).
Critics argued that she had spent the fund's assets on corporate  governance activism not
because she believed it would improve the fund's performance  but because it would
bolster her reputation as a populist politician who would stand up against big business.
This category of agency problems also includes the exercise of direct financial self-
interest, such as the use of pension fund assets to benefit friends and family of the board.
In the United States, the trustees of a Maryland state pension fund were criticized for
investing funds through a money manager that was a significant campaign donor to the
state governor. Despite having consistently low performance,  the money manager
received fees that were significantly higher than those paid to other managers.
A further example of a politically based agency problem is the funding of local initiatives
for their.  social benefit without appropriate weight being given to the risk-return
characteristics  of the investment. For example, a pension fund may choose to invest in a
financially troubled local business to save the jobs that the company provides, but at a
risk to the fund's assets, or government bonds may be purchased at lower than market
interest rates to further the borrowing ability of the government. The trustees in such
cases may be acting on their own initiative, perhaps in their role as a publicly elected
official, or they may be acting under pressure from outside political parties.  Other
examples from the U.S. experience include decisions to select investment advisors based
not on their performance  but on a preference for in-state managers or to further
affirmative  action goals (Romano  1993). Such investment managers  are likely to be small
and unable to take advantage of economies of scale on transactions,  which will reduce
fund performance.
It is important to remember that the party in power chooses the goals served by politically
motivated actions, and that other parties may oppose these goals.  These actions thus may
be a way for the ruling party to further its social goals without following the regular
political decision-making procedure for resource allocation.  For example,  some
commentators in the United States have raised concerns that the California Public
Employees' Retirement  System (CalPERS)  is dominated by Democrats  and that they are
using the system's assets to attempt to bring about social change without regard to the
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direct financial  health of the system (Walsh 2002).  Such actions nonetheless may be
widely supported by the public.
Romano (1993  and 1995) has argued that public pension funds with trustees who are
susceptible to political pressure will perform significantly worse than those boards with
politically independent trustees. United States Federal Reserve  Chairman Alan Greenspan
likewise has argued against the investment of social security funds in equities: "In sum,
because I do not believe that it is politically feasible to insulate such huge funds from
governmental  influence, investing social security trust fund assets in equities
compromises the efficient allocation of our capital."
Given that politically motivated decisions may have broad popular support,  as is arguable
in the case of CalPERS, there remains much debate concerning the significance of agency
problems founded in political motivations. Recognition of the need to control self-
interest-based  agency problems in contrast may be assumed to be universal. In a survey
conducted for this paper of pension funds in various countries, two of the 26 respondents
answered "yes" to the following question:  "Has there been any serious case of fraud or
other scandal that resulted in formal investigation in the last five years?" Their responses
indicate that this is a problem that deserves serious consideration when structuring the
governance  of public pension plans. The next section considers the extent of the second
type of agency problem.
Il.C  Political  Involvement: Government Restrictions  and Social
Mandates
That there is political involvement in the investment choices of public pension funds is
well known. This involvement can come in the form of legislation passed on the initiative
of trustees or can involve mandates to make certain investments or prohibitions on other
investments.
In the United States, the use of economically targeted investments  (ETIs) was in the
1990s one of the most controversial issues facing public and private pension fund
management. ETIs are investments in which the fund managers take into consideration
not only the investment return but also the economic benefits to the local community
(GAO 1995; Watson 1994). Examples of ETIs include California's investment of US$
375 million in single-family homes to help increase affordable housing and create jobs,
Connecticut's investment of US$ 25 million in a local company to save  1,000 jobs, and
Pennsylvania's  decision to provide favorable interest rates for home mortgages
(Stevenson 1992). Another common ETI practice involves using pension funds to provide
venture capital to in-state companies that may not be able to attract the attention of other
venture capitalists (GAO  1995). Until recently,  the National Pension Fund (NPF) of the
Republic of Korea met a requirement to contribute to economic and social development
by lending to the government at nonmarket rates  and purchasing nontradable government
bonds.
The Singaporean Central Provident Fund (CPF) similarly has many objectives in addition
to its core objective of ensuring sufficient retirement benefits. It administers schemes
covering housing, medical savings accounts, and education; it also permits extensive pre-
retirement withdrawals  for investment in real estate,  financial assets, and even gold and
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commodities.  The CPF has different accounts to which individual contributions are
credited. The ordinary account can be utilized for financing housing purchase,
investments in approved shares and stocks and to finance children's tertiary education
The special account is a true pension retirement account.  The medical account is used to
pay for hospital services,  certain outpatient services, and catastrophic health insurance
premiums.  Contribution rates to the different accounts vary by age and for workers up to
35 years of age the contribution rates to the three different accounts are 26%, 4% and 6%,
respectively (Chia and Tsui 2003).
Advocates of ETIs claim that such investments  can be structured to obtain a market rate
of return, but they face significant opposition. Proponents  of ETIs further argue that gaps
in the capital market leave certain socially desirable projects under funded;  opponents
claim that the true motivation for these pension fund investments  is political. In  1992, a
lobbyist for CalPERS  referred to ETIs as "politicizing" pension investments rather than
"maximizing" them (Vise 1992). Nofsinger (1998:  89) argued:  "[ETIs]  are often highly
visible projects that attempt to generate  a public good in a concentrated,  geographical
region.  The claimable political benefits of an ETI policy can be large and the costs of
claiming them small.  The agency cost that taxpayers bear is not visible at the initial
investment because the costs are not realized until some distant time when an increase in
funding is needed for the under funded pension plan."
ETIs may be able to achieve an acceptable rate of return and taxpayers may be willing to
take on the extra risk in exchange  for social benefits,  but few pension funds have
established  criteria for selecting ETI projects (Iglesias and Palacios 2000). They are thus
entirely under the purview of the board or of the ruling political party.
In addition to the mandating of certain investments, political interference may also see
restrictions placed on the types of investments a fund may make. For example, a pension
fund may be restricted from investing in foreign markets or in anything other than
government bonds. The difficulties presented by such restrictions  are compounded where
there are limited investment opportunities in the home country (Iglesias and Palacios
2000).  Even where explicit developmental and social mandates do not exist, prohibitions
on certain types of investments may be sufficient in themselves to ensure that funds are
invested in social projects.  The five public pension funds in Honduras that were surveyed
for this paper do not have any explicit developmental  mandate, but they are restricted
from investing abroad. Attempts to diversify the fund's portfolio within the context of the
limited domestic  opportunities have seen approximately 30 percent of fund assets
invested in housing loans to participants, often at a subsidized rate.
In Ghana, the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) is required to be
invested in assets with adequate yield and liquidity and an acceptable  risk level.
Managers must follow basic portfolio theory rules for asset diversification  as they seek to
maintain an optimal  funding ratio and to secure long-term  rates of return for the fund (Dei
2001). However, the SSNIT investment policy includes social and developmental
mandates in the following areas: housing finance,  student loans, and industrial estates.
Although returns on these assets were not reported, Dei comments that the student loan
scheme has become a burden for the SSNIT. These loans are provided to students
(including university students) at a subsidized interest rate.  While the number of students
has increased considerably,  postgraduate unemployment  also has increased, creating a
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further burden on the system. The loans furthermore are indexed to inflation, and as they
increase in size government delays in the payment of interest subsidies to the SSNIT
again increase the overall burden on the fund.
This paper's survey of public pension funds around the world revealed that the use of
restrictions and mandates is widespread. The most common restriction is on foreign
investments, with 57 percent of the surveyed funds facing prohibition on investment
abroad.  Other restrictions include prohibitions  on equities (14 percent) and loans (19
percent) (see Figure 1).
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Explicit investment mandates also are common, with 60 percent of the funds operating
under at least one type of mandate.  These mandates include requirements to invest in
government bonds (including national, state, provincial, and municipal bonds) (48
percent),  in social projects such as housing (24 percent), and in general economic
development obligations (32 percent).  The use of restrictions and mandates  furthermore
may be more widespread than these figures indicate,  as trustees may self-impose these
investment practices on the fund in the absence of explicit requirements.
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Il.D  The Effects on Fund Performance
One result of policies that seek to fulfill social objectives beyond fund value
maximization  is poor asset allocation, which in turn may lead to low investment returns.
Recent studies show that asset allocation can explain up to 90 percent of the variability in
the return on assets over time (Brinson  et al.  1986; Brinson et al.  1991). Where asset
allocation decisions are based on politics rather than on sound portfolio theory,
investment performance is sure to suffer-to the extent that in some countries public
pension fund returns are consistently lower than the interest rate paid by banks to
individual savings accounts in those same countries  (Iglesias and Palacios 2000).
Table 2 illustrates the portfolio allocations of the funds surveyed for this paper. The
average  fund has 35 percent of its assets allocated  to government bonds, 25 percent to
bank deposits, and  15 percent to equities. More than 20 percent of the funds have at least
80 percent of their assets allocated to government bonds or bank deposit, with the average
fund having 60 percent of its assets in either government bonds or bank deposits. Almost
one-quarter of the sample have no investments in equities, and approximately two-thirds
have less' than  10 percent of their assets in equities. By contrast, analysis of 111 U.S. state
and local pension funds from 2000 revealed the average  fund to have 59 percent of its
assets allocated to equities.
The funds in our international sample used a wide range of asset allocations.  Examination
of the minimum and maximum portfolio  allocations demonstrates  this variety: while
sonie funds face restrictions  on investments  in loans, one fund has invested 39 percent of
its assets iti  loans. Another fund has more than half of its assets in real estate.
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Table 2. Allocation  of Assets  for 26 Pension Funds (% of Portfolio)
Investment-Type'  : > - Avrag-  ---  MedIan>  MlnimC-M'K  - MSlwi  imzT
Government Bonds  35  20  0  98
Bank Deposits  25  23  0  93
Equities  15  7  0  63
Loans  6  2  0  39
Corporate  Bonds  4  2  0  22
Real Estate  8  2  0  52
Other  4  1  0  23
III  SOLVING AGENCY  PROBLEMS
IIIA  Separation of Ownership and Control
A fundamental problem with public pension funds is how to achieve a workable
separation of ownership and control. For example, if the plan participants  are taken to be
the owners of the fund, problems may result where another group (of, for example,
government officials) controls the pension fund. This section considers the implications
of the separation of ownership and control on pension plan governance.  It considers  first
the situation of private pension plans and then the more complex problem of public
pension plans.
lll.B Ownership and Control in Private Pensions
Recent work by Besley and Prat (2002) applies agency theory to private pension fund
governance.  Their goal was to find the optimal governance structure of defined
contribution (DC) and defined benefit (DB) pension plans with respect to three potential
sources of agency problems: the responsibility for monitoring the asset manager
("vigilance"),  asset allocation decisions, and the plan's level of funding. Governance
structure matters because, due to the inability to exactly specify the obligations of all
parties, the plan's beneficiaries  and sponsor do not have complete contracting ability.
Thus, the incentives are important that encourage the parties to monitor or make
appropriate asset allocation decisions.  The optimal governance structure is one in which
the risk-bearer is also the decision-maker (that is, there is no separation of ownership
from control).
Determination of the optimal governance  structure requires that the owner of the plan
(which may also be termned the risk-bearer or residual claimant) be identified  and if
possible granted decision control responsibility. The residual claimant is the group with
the greatest incentive to act with vigilance because it is this group that is best positioned
to enjoy the benefits of such actions. For DC plans, the residual claimant is the
beneficiary,  as benefits suffer from poor financial performance but increase with better
financial performance.  For DB plans, because the benefits  such plans do not change with
the performance of their assets the residual claimants are the sponsors, as it is the
sponsors that bear the risks of poor financial performance. If the beneficiaries have  a
comparative cost advantage in acting with vigilance,  the plan therefore should be
structured as a DC plan. If the sponsors have a comparative advantage,  the plan should be
structured as a DB plan.
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This model considers only a single sponsor and a single beneficiary.  With joint residual
claimants, such as multiple beneficiaries,  potential free-rider problems may reduce the
incentive to monitor. That is, while the costs to monitor the asset manager would be
borne by a single beneficiary,  all beneficiaries  would enjoy the benefits equally. This is
similar to the problem of shareholders that have small ownership stakes in a corporation.
For DC plans in which the residual claimants include numerous beneficiaries, we would
argue that there is a strong need for a third-party monitor, such as a board of trustees.
These trustees could be either insiders or outsiders.  (Insiders are plan beneficiaries,
hereafter referred to as "member trustees" to avoid confusion with insider directors of
corporations.) Member trustees have an incentive to monitor as they have a financial
interest in the plan as well as a bond with the other beneficiaries (for example,  coworkers
and friends), but they typically have little financial expertise. Outsiders, in contrast, are
trustees with professional  skills related to monitoring but with no financial interest in the
plan (hereafter referred to as "professional trustees"). As an incentive  for the professional
trustees, their role should have a strong reputational  effect. For such an incentive to exist
there must be present  an efficient career market for the trustee and a direct link between
monitoring and the rate of return on assets. Defined benefit plans ideally should rely more
on professional trustees, while DC plans should use self-motivated member trustees (as
they are part of the residual claimant group).
With respect to asset allocation decisions,  the implications of residual status on choice of
governance are similar.  The residual claimant is the efficient asset allocator. For example,
the sponsor in a DC plan is not an efficient asset allocator because it does not fully bear
the costs of its decisions and may have an incentive to invest in its own interests (for
example, to over invest in the sponsor company's stock). In DB plans the sponsor again
may not be an efficient asset allocator if, for example,  it has limited liability for the
insolvency of the plan: with limited liability, the sponsor may be willing to take on
excessive risk.
Consistent with agency theory, Besley and Prat (2002)  argue that if decision-makers  do
not bear the full cost of their decisions inefficiencies can result (Fama and Jensen  1983a).
These inefficiencies can have a significant impact on the residual claimant.  With respect
to private pension plans, the identification of the residual claimant is necessary to
determine the most effective governance  structure. Besley and Prat argue that for DC
plans the beneficiary is the residual claimant, but for DB plans it is the sponsor. However,
the sponsor in a DB plan is a qualified residual claimant to the extent it has limited
liability for insolvency of the plan.
Ill.  C Ownership and Control in Public Pension Funds
The identification of the residual claimant is less straightforward in public pension plans.
In the context of civil service public DB plans that are not pay-as-you-go,  Murphy and
Van Nuys (1994) argue that the residual claimants  are the taxpayers. Because benefits are
defined, funding problems with the pension plan may fall not on the beneficiaries but on
the taxpayers, who must put up funds to cover unfunded liabilities. This argument holds
to the extent that benefits paid to plan participants cannot be reduced. If benefits can be
reduced, the plan participants  (especially those retired members  currently receiving
benefits)  are also residual claimants. In addition, where poor management of the pension
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plan's assets leads to an increased contribution rate for the plan participants,  current plan
members also have a status similar to that of residual claimants.  One potential difference
between beneficiaries  and taxpayers, however,  is the ability of beneficiaries to more
completely protect their interests through contractual relationships with the pension plan
sponsor.
For DC plans, the residual claimants are the beneficiaries.  This stakeholder group bears
the cost of poor asset management  in the form of lower retirement benefits, although it
may be the case that there is a guaranteed minimum rate of return on the assets. It also
may be that government practices create an implicit guarantee that if market returns
become so low as to render such pension instruments  ineffective, the government will
finance the retirement benefits of those with less than a politically acceptable cash
balance in their retirement accounts.  In such a case, the taxpayers again are the residual
claimant.
Overall, there may be multiple different groups claiming residual claimant status and that
therefore have the incentive to monitor the performance of the pension plan. To the extent
that both taxpayers  and beneficiaries  are residual claimants, a basic application of agency
theory would dictate that both should have decision control rights, including asset
allocation decisions, the monitoring of asset managers (including hiring, firing, and
establishing compensation  agreements), and other management decisions. Of course,
these groups may have significant conflicts with respect to how the plan should be
managed.  For example, a pension fund's increased performance can either be distributed
to the plan members through higher cost-of-living adjustments and lower employee
contributions, or it can be distributed to the taxpayers through a lowered  government
contribution.  The exact allocation of decision control rights will depend on the structure
of the pension plan. For example,  in a DC plan without minimum guarantees the
taxpayers  are not residual claimants and the decision control rights should go to the plan
participants, who bear the wealth consequences of their choices (see Murphy and Van
Nuys  1994).
For national and civil service pension schemes (in which the beneficiaries  are a more
clearly defined group of individuals), the widely dispersed nature of the beneficiaries
means that they must exercise their control through trustee representatives.  These
representatives,  however, may not bear sufficient wealth consequences  of their decisions
for there to exist for them the incentive to avoid moral hazard problems  or to maximize
pension value. They may in this sense be similar to Besley's and Prat's (2002)
professional trustees of private pensions and require extemal incentives such as the
extemal labor market. Likewise, for corporate boards directors have an incentive to
perform well to develop their reputations as "experts in decision control" (Fama and
Jensen 1983a:  315). In both cases, the trustees/directors have incentives to do their job
appropriately  and with vigilance, because  their actions will be rewarded or punished in
their future career paths.
A similar analysis  should be conducted for public pensions. That is, we should ask if
there is an extemal labor market for trustees that will take  into consideration  a trustee's
performance on the board. In many ways, the external labor market works as an outcome
control, but there are problems with using outcome controls for public pensions (see also
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Section lI.D). Namely, will the external market make a direct link between the trustee's
monitoring performance  and the fund's performance? It is quite possible that the market
would only punish poor performance  and would fail to reward solid performance.  For
example, many trustees in the United States fear negative publicity should their fund
perform poorly but expect no reward (financially or from the media) for a strong
performance.  There is an incentive as such to concentrate on the avoidance of negative
publicity rather on maximizing the fund's value. Additionally, the labor market for some
trustees is the political market, engendering  a motivation that can worsen agency
problems rather than serve as a control mechanism, as trustees may use the fund's assets
to win the favor of certain constituency groups. In such situations the use of self-
motivated member trustees may be needed.  This solution will work better for civil service
pension plans than for national schemes, because the member trustee will have a closer
bond to the plan (as argued in Besley and Prat (2002)).
III.D  Implications for Governance
The above analysis demonstrates the importance of involving the residual claimant  in
monitoring and control,  and its value in reducing the inefficiency caused by the
separation of decision-making from risk-bearing. For example, consider the decision of
whether or not to allocate assets to economically targeted investments, which may or may
not have similar risk-return characteristics  to other investment options: In the case of a
DB plan, where there is no chance of raising participant contribution rates or lowering
benefits, the taxpayers are the sole residual  claimants and their representatives on the
board (government  officials) bear the risk. In such a situation, the decision-making would
be efficient if there were sufficient incentives for the board to perform its job
appropriately.
The challenge facing public pension fund managers is how to create the appropriate
controls and incentives  for trustees. To determine which governance mechanisms are
appropriate, it is necessary to identify for which behaviors  the trustees would be rewarded
or punished. Recalling some of the agency relationship  characteristics  identified by
Eisenhardt (1989), we see that there are problems with using outcome controls.  Most
indicators point toward the use of behavioral controls. A key govemance  characteristic is
outcome uncertainty.  Many factors beyond the control of trustees can affect the
performance of a fund;  for example, limited local investments or short-term economic
downturns can greatly affect performance.  Likewise, there is a problem with the
measurability of the outcome. Should the trustees be judged against a standard of short-
term retums or consistent long-term performance?  It is as difficult to make an interim
judgment of performance  toward a long-term goal as it is to accurately assess the worth
of an investment decision based on the achievement of short-term goals. Furthermore,  it
is difficult to determine the contribution of any single trustee toward the accomplishment
of a goal,  and this creates the potential for a free-rider problem.
To the extent that there is goal conflict between the agent and principal (for example,
whether to invest the fund's assets for value maximization or invest them to achieve other
social goals), there also is a need for behavioral controls. This is especially true for public
pensions, as decisions to invest in ETIs may not significantly affect investment
performance until years in the future, and possibly after the trustees supporting the
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initiative are no longer on the board. Likewise,  decisions on actuarial assumptions or
benefits may produce little change in the short run while creating significant long-termn
costs.
All of these factors support the use of behavioral rather than outcome controls for
trustees. These potential  controls are discussed in the next section.  First, however, there is
a discussion of the limitations of external controls. The corporate governance system
relies heavily on external controls, but no such controls are available  for the governance
of public pensions. This further demonstrates the importance of a governing board to
public pensions.
Ill.E External Controls
There are three types of external controls for corporations:  the product market, the market
for corporate control, and large shareholders.  Should managerial agency problems reach
the point where they significantly harm performance,  a corporation may go bankrupt (fail
in the product market) or be taken over by another organization  (fail in the market for
corporate control).
These external  controls are available neither for national public pension plans nor for
civil service plans. In a centralized system, participants  are unable either to shift their
assets from one plan to another or to withdraw their assets from the plan. There is thus no
equivalent of a product market. For civil service plans, the quality of those plans may
have an effect on employee recruitment and retention, and failure to recruit employees
may arguably be seen as equivalent to failure in the product market.  However,  in matters
of finance, money is provided for a future payment and it is difficult for an outsider-in
the case of a public pension plan, the plan participants-to  determine if there is a problem
with the use of those funds. This is in contrast to a consumer product purchase, where the
consumer can typically and readily ascertain if there is a problem (Caprio and Levine
2002). This problem increases where there is inadequate disclosure, because in such cases
the portfolio composition of pension funds can easily be altered without the knowledge of
the fund's stakeholders.  There thus are significant  limits on the capability of the
participant labor market to discipline management of the pension fund.
Nor is there a market for corporate control, as the plan participants do not have an
ownership interest that can be traded on a secondary market. In addition, the fact that
ownership interests are nontransferable means that other mechanisms of the corporate
world, such as managerial ownership and equity incentives, are also not available
(Mayers  et al.  1997). Finally, because everyone's  ownership interests are essentially
equal, there is no possibility of a single shareholder emerging with an incentive to
monitor the organization's performance.  A group may serve this role-for example,  a
labor union may represent the interests of its membership  with respect to the pension
fund-but different unions within the general taxpayer population may have
disagreements on how the fund should be managed. This is in contrast to the corporate
situation in which shareholders can be assumed to have the same interest (increased share
value).
In situations where external controls are not available,  agency theory predicts  a greater
emphasis on the board as monitor. In other words, the various control technologies can
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substitute for one another. For corporations, this means that where a market for corporate
control is not available greater emphasis will fall on the outside directors on the board.
Mayers et al.  (1997) supported this substitution hypothesis in a study of mutual and stock
insurance  companies. In mutuals, ownership rights are connected with customer
insurance policies and therefore are nontransferable.  In stock companies, ownership
rights are not connected with policies and are freely transferable.  Compared to stock
insurance companies, mutuals are significantly more likely to have either a majority of
outside directors on the board or a majority of outsiders on standing committees.  The
presence of outsiders also reduces management's consumption of perquisites, such as
salary, while other costs that do not involve a conflict between management and owners
are not significantly different.
IV  IMPLICATIONS  FOR THE GOVERNING  BODY OF PUBLIC
PENSION  PLANS
Public pension  funds thus clearly need a strong governing body. Compared  to
corporations, for which there are available a variety of external and internal control
mechanisms,  for public pensions the board is essentially the only available  control. The
following sections provide an initial analysis of the issues that should be addressed when
creating a board that has the appropriate incentives to be an effective monitor and
manager of a fund. Using Eisenhardt's terminology,  these are mostly behavioral rather
than outcome controls.
IV.A  Board Composition
The trustees of U.S. civil service plans  generally fall into one of three categories: they are
elected by plan participants, appointed by the government,  or serve as ex officio
members. Trustees may be elected by either active employees  or retired plan members,
and they themselves may be active or retired members. Appointments  are typically made
by a chief elected official such as the governor or mayor or by a governing body such as a
legislative committee,  and often are made to provide representation  for stakeholder
groups in cases where beneficiary groups are not allowed to directly elect their own
representatives.  Ex officio trustees will serve on the board by virtue of their holding a
particular public office, such as that of state treasurer or controller.
As discussed earlier, corporations have both inside directors  and outside directors. Inside
directors are also managers of the corporation in question, and can be either the source of
moral hazard or lack the incentives to control moral hazard problems  originating with the
CEO. For public pensions, moral hazard problems (or goal conflicts with plan
participants) typically are rooted with those trustees that also are government officials or
that are appointed by government officials.  A government may be able to bypass the
board to use a fund's assets for other social or political goals (Iglesias and Palacios 2000),
but it also may be able to achieve the same result if the board is dominated by trustees
sympathetic or otherwise allied to it. Government-affiliated  trustees are effectively the
equivalent of corporate insider trustees.
Member trustees that are elected by plan members are not subject to the same political
pressures as ex officio and appointed trustees.  In this sense, their political independence
makes them analogous to independent,  outside directors  on corporate boards. Just as
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outside directors theoretically are  able to focus on shareholder interests without undue
influence from corporate  insiders, so too are member-elected trustees able to focus on
beneficiary interests without undue political interference.  They may also serve to monitor
politically affiliated trustees. Trustees  appointed by the government to represent specific
stakeholder groups also may fall into this category, depending on how they came to be
selected for appointment.
The composition of the board for a national pension plan is likely to differ from that of a
board for a civil service plan. In the United States, for example, there are hundreds of
state and local pension plans for civil servants, including those for teachers, judges,
police, and firefighters.  In such cases, plan members may be able to usefully elect their
own representative.  For national schemes, however, the election of trustees may not be
feasible and may actually undermine the pension fund's goals  (Palacios 2002). Instead,
national  schemes often have a tripartite board, with board members nominated to
represent unions, employers,  and government.
Analysis of a data set of more than 200 state and local U.S. civil service plans in the
1990s showed the composition of trustees on the average board to be approximately two-
thirds with political affiliations  and one-third elected by plan members.  On average,
almost one-half of the trustees were appointed by government  official or committee  and
one-third were not members of that pension plan. The size of the board averaged  8.5
trustees, with a range of 3 to 32 trustees.
For our sample of 26 public pension funds, the number of trustees on the board averaged
12, with a range of 3 to 29 (see Table 3). The average proportion of ex officio trustees on
the board was just less than 20 percent, and 70 percent of trustees were appointed.  In 10
of the 26 plans, the entire board consisted of government-appointed  members.  Only eight
of the 26 respondent funds had at least one trustee that was elected to the board. Instead
of elected members,  it was not uncommon for government-appointed  trustees to represent
trade unions or other employee associations:  approximately 25 percent of board members
represented trade unions or other employee associations and less than  15 percent
represented employers. Approximately 40 percent of the board therefore could be
classified  as "outside" directors under the corporation analogy, as they are potentially
independent of the government.  This is approximately the same percentage as for U.S.
state and local pension plans. However, while these trustees  are appointed to represent
different stakeholder  groups, government influence may impact their ability to act as an
independent  monitor.
A final issue with respect to trustees that act as representatives of different  groups is the
expertise of those trustees. Only 62 percent of the funds surveyed indicated that they had
at least one expert or professional member on the board, but among these funds on
average 47 percent of trustees  were identified as experts. One fund indicated that all of its
four trustees were experts.
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Table 3. Board Composition (fraction of board)
. ... ND  - Minimuim  6i  Maximumn.a  Mean  Media-
How selected  to
board:
Ex officio  26  0.00  0.85  0.1850  0.0000
Appointed  26  0.09  1.00  0.7044  0.8167
Elected  26  0.00  0.91  0.1407  0.0000
Trustees representing
specific groups:
Trade unions  25  0.00  0.62  0.1844  0.2000
Employers association  25  0.00  0.38  0.1291  0.0000
Other employees  25  0.00  0.38  0.0885  0.0000
association
Government as plan  25  0.00  1.00  0.3104  0.2500
sponsor
IV.B  Nomination and Termination
An independent and vigilant board requires trustees that are not subject to political
influence and that are free to exercise their independent judgment.  These are the reasons
behind the strong push toward corporate  governance for boards dominated by outside
directors. It is feasible for the participants of smaller civil service pension plans to
directly elect some outside trustees, but for national schemes this may not be possible.
Instead, the government may appoint trustees to represent stakeholder groups or to bring
independent expertise to the board. The government's involvement in such appointments
inevitably raises the concern that the trustees selected will be biased toward the
government's policy goals and therefore will not be truly independent, however.
The equivalent situation on a corporate board would be that of the CEO selecting outside
directors; should this occur, these directors  at a minimum could be expected to be
sympathetic to the CEO's views and therefore to be incapable of providing independent
monitoring (Zajac and Westphal  1996; Main et al.  1995). The corporate governance
solution to this problem has been to establish a nominating committee comprised entirely
of independent directors. While the CEO will still have some influence in selecting new
directors, it will be minimized.  It is also recommended  that the committee have fixed
criteria for the selection of new directors, to ensure that the directors  are qualified and to
provide another control against favoritism in the selection process. Some public pension
funds are experimenting with similar mechanisms.
The Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) provides one example of how a
pension fund is attempting to depoliticize the nomination of public pension plan
governors (MacNaughton 2001). For the CPPIB, the federal finance minister and the
finance ministers of the nine participating provinces  appointed a nominating committee.
Each government nominated one committee member, and the federal finance minister
chose a private sector CEO as chair. For trustees, the committee identifies a set of
qualified (as previously defined) prospective candidates  from across Canada, referring
this set to the federal finance minister. The federal finance minister then consults with his
provincial counterparts on the proposed names before making final selection from the list
recommended by the committee.
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In New Zealand, the Minister of Finance appoints a committee to nominate potential
trustees of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund. At least four members of the
nominating comnrnittee must have work experience qualifying them as investment
professionals.  The Minister of Finance must then consult with parliament before
recommending the nominees to the Governor General for appointment (Palacios 2002).
The board is only responsible for investments, however:  should this model be applied to a
board that has control also over such matters as benefits, there are additional concerns
that first should be taken into consideration.
It is also important that there be set procedures for the removal of trustees,  to permit the
fair removal of those that abuse their position while preventing the arbitrary removal of
those who are performing their job. Trustees that are not subject to arbitrary termination
are more likely to exercise independent judgment and less likely to bow to outside
pressures  (Carmichael 2002). The termination of a trustee should be fully disclosed to all
interested  stakeholders and should be made in accordance with predetermined processes
and conditions of termination.  The CPPIB appoints trustees on the basis of three-year
terms, renewable three times, and no director may be removed from the board during his
or her term in office for any reason other than illegal or immoral conduct.  In New
Zealand, by contrast, the Minister of Finance may remove any board member for any
reason that the minister deems appropriate (Palacios 2002).  In our sample of pension
funds, only one-third of the funds surveyed had written criteria establishing acceptable
causes for dismissal.
IV.  C Accountability
The governing body should have a clear understanding of to whom they are accountable.
In corporations,  it is clearly understood that the board is accountable to the shareholders.
For public pension funds, in contrast, there can be ambiguity on the issue of
accountability.  There are two possible groups of residual claimants,  taxpayers and plan
participants, and trustees may view themselves as being accountable to one or both of
these stakeholder groups.  They also may see themselves  as being accountable to the
political administration  in power. In the United States, law mandates that private pension
plans be managed solely in the best interests of the plan participants,  and the trustees thus
are accountable only to those participants.  In some countries the same applies to public
pension funds. For example, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act directs the
board "to manage any amounts that are transferred to it . ..  in the best interests of the
contributors and beneficiaries  under that Act; and to invest its assets with a view to
achieving a maximum rate of return, without undue risk of loss, having regard to the
factors that may affect the funding of the Canada Pension Plan and the ability of the
Canada Pension Plan to meet its financial obligations"  (Palacios 2002).
Establishing a clear understanding of to whom the board is accountable is important for
several reasons. A recent empirical study on the application of agency theory to nonprofit
boards of directors  in the United States reveals some of these reasons (Miller 2002).  First,
for nonprofit organizations, there are no clear owners.  Certain parties make donations to
the organization,  and some suggest that those parties may serve as monitors of the board
(Fama and Jensen  1983b), but they are not generally considered to "own" the
organization. In addition, there is no residual claimant:  instead, the board has a more
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general accountability to society. In her study, Miller found that some boards were able to
articulate an "ownership"  group-typically arising through the organization's perceived
accountability to the community-while other boards only stated a general accountability
to the board itself, founded in a responsibility to maintain the organization  as a going
concern.
For those boards that could articulate an ownership-like  group, the trustees were able to
meaningfully discuss the interests and expectations of that group. These board members
recognized  a clear mission for the organization and were able to keep their focus on that
mission. By contrast, those boards that viewed themselves as only accountable to
themselves were seen as less capable of fulfilling their oversight roles. While the board
members  recognized a fiduciary responsibility to the organization and the management of
its finances, they did not know how to work toward these goals. Miller stated that for
such boards, their "objectives  for monitoring lack specificity."  In addition,  she found that
board members would use the rhetoric of fulfilling fiduciary duties, but they usually
uncritically  accepted all of the information that was provided to them by management
staff. These boards did not believe that they could change the organization's behavior and
were less vigilant than the boards with an identified ownership group.
Boards thus need to have a clear and specific statement  citing to whom they are
accountable.  Many pension funds have already identified this group as the plan
participants,  or have had this group identified for them by statute or regulation. If this
"ownership"  group is to be expanded, those other stakeholder groups that are to be
included must be specified. Without a clear understanding of to whom it is accountable,
the board is likely to be ineffective in monitoring or managing the fund.
IV.D Performance Measures
Related to accountability is the issue of how a board measures its performance.  For
corporations, performance can easily be measured by share value or return on investment.
For public pension funds, however, the board could base its performance on funding
levels, the size of investment return, achieving a set investment return target, reducing
administrative costs, or some other measure (or any combination of these measures).
Similar to the issue of identifying an ownership group, failure to specify a performance
goal can lead to a less vigilant board of trustees.  Miller's study of nonprofit organizations
is again instructive on this issue.
For nonprofits, there is no widely accepted clear measure of performance.  In her study,
Miller found that some boards had developed a consensus on clear performance  goals in
such areas as budgetary issues, recruitment of donors, and the success of community
service programs. Other boards, however, could not articulate a set of performance  goals.
For the boards with performance  goals, the members had a better understanding of the
information they needed to perform their oversight role and of how to use that
information.  For the boards that were unable to articulate performance  goals, the
members typically monitored them based on their personal skills. For example, board
members who were lawyers in their professional lives considered  the legal issues and
accountant members considered the financial issues.  These members gathered
information they needed to fulfill these limited roles but had little knowledge of the
performance of the organization outside these areas.  In some cases, and even though they
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believed that they were fully inforned, the trustees were not even aware of the programs
operated by the organization.  They were unaware of these programs because they did not
involve issues related to their particular  expertise.  These members clearly lacked the
necessary information to meaningfully monitor the organization,  and their actions in
addition did not focus on achieving any specific goal. As Miller stated, the focus of the
board's actions were "primarily on form, not on substance." For the boards with criteria
for measuring performance, however,  a comprehensive strategic plan aimed at achieving
those goals was easily developed.
IV.E  Roles of the Board
The board may have control over a wide variety of decisions with respect to the fund,
including the setting of actuarial assumptions,  investment of fund assets, setting of
benefits, and other decisions that relate to the management of the fund. In this sense, the
governing board of a pension fund is more involved in the running of the organization
than is a corporate board of directors.  Where a corporate board may assist in the general
setting of strategy, it serves mostly to provide advice to management and to monitor
management's behavior on behalf of shareholders.  In public pension funds, the board
typically takes on an active management role, including delegation to professional
managers,  in addition to monitoring the pension fund staff.
In the United States, the board typically has authority over investment decisions. For
example,  a sample of state and local pension funds in 1998 showed 88 percent of funds to
have investment  authority. For the remaining 12 percent, investment decisions were most
likely made by a state investment board that is separate from the board of trustees. The
board also usually had control over actuarial  assumptions and benefits decisions (89 and
68 percent, respectively).  The funds in our international survey showed a similar use of
authority. The responses indicated that for 92 percent of the funds the board has authority
over investments  and for 77 percent it has authority over actuarial  assumptions.  In
addition, 73 percent of the boards have authority over the selection of managers of fund
activities.
One of the key roles of the board is to develop an investment strategy that maximizes
returns at a risk level tolerable to the fund's stakeholders and that provides sufficient
liquidity to meet benefit payment requirements  (Mitchell 2002). To establish a strategy
that is right for the fund, the board must decide how to allocate its assets and who will
manage the funds: should it outsource to a private firm or employ the fund's own staff to
conduct investments? The asset allocation decision involves many different factors,
including the division between equities  and fixed income investments,  the level of
diversification, the sectors of the economy in which to invest, whether or not to invest
outside the borders of the country, and so on.
With respect to the use of investment managers,  approximately 75 percent of U.S. state
and local plans used external managers for all fund assets.  From the international  sample,
only one fund of the 25 funds that responded to the question reported using external
managers  for all assets. The average  fund used external managers  for just 13 percent of
its portfolio, but more than 50 percent of funds did not outsource any assets at all. Of
those funds using external asset managers,  less than 40 percent had explicit, written
criteria for selecting managers. This creates the possibility of trustees granting asset
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manager awards based on political or personal preference,  rather than on criteria that
would identify managers most likely to act in the best interests of the plan participants.
Overall, this evidence suggests that boards are keeping significant control over their
fund's assets.
Some pension funds seek independence from political interference  through the structure
of their pension system and the assignment of different roles to different trustees. In
Canada there are two separate entities, the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and the CPP
Investment Board (CPPIB), and two separate governing bodies. The CPP is the exclusive
responsibility of the federal and provincial governments.  These governments  design,
administer, and set policies for the plan for tasks such as the paying of benefits and the
collection of contributions. The CPPIB is a separate organization that serves only to
invest the funds of the CPP. Additionally,  the CPPIB is governed independently of
government by professional managers and its own board of directors.
The boards of corporations often divide their work and assign primary responsibility for
that work to separate committees, according to the different roles of each. Due to
concerns over agency problems,  it is recommended that key oversight committees,  such
as the compensation committee and the audit committee, be staffed by independent
directors. For example, a compensation committee  staffed by insiders may establish a
CEO compensation  and incentive plan that is overly generous;  outside directors  are more
likely to exercise independent judgment and reduce such abuses.  The boards of pension
funds also use committees, but these are not as widespread  as in the corporate world.  For
example, while all corporations are required to have an audit committee,  less than half of
the funds (45 percent) in our international  sample used an audit committee.  Sixty-four
percent had an investment committee and 21 percent a governance committee.
Governance committees  are fairly new in corporate governance.  While boards have
typically had a nominating committee  to assist the nomination of directors, more firms
are switching to governance committees to which they can defer additional
responsibilities,  such as the establishment of board meeting  agendas, adoption of
guidelines for governance practices,  selection of directors to serve on committees, and so
on. In spite of the fact that only a few pension plans in our sample had governance
committees, it is encouraging  that pension managers are recognizing  the importance of
boards and are establishing proper board practices.
IV.F Standards of Behavior
Corporate boards of directors are subject to fiduciary duties, and failure to comply with
those duties can result in legal liability.  In the United States, private pension plans are
subject to the strict fiduciary requirements  of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) statute.  ERISA's "exclusive benefit" (duty of loyalty) and "prudent person"
(duty of care) rules require trustees to make sound, well-planned investment choices  for
the sole benefit of plan participants. For example, some have argued that it would be a
breach of fiduciary duty for a private plan trustee to take into consideration certain social
or community benefits when making investment decisions, because as a consequence
such a decision could not be for the "exclusive benefit" of plan participants.
Even though U.S. public pension plan trustees are not subject to ERISA, some
commentators have argued that the common law of trusts establishes a fiduciary duty that
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is not significantly different from the ERISA standard (Romano  1993). In addition, many
public pension plans are required by state law or internal policy to operate under the
"prudent person" rule, which is a duty of care to act as a reasonably prudent person who
is familiar with these matters in managing the investments of the fund.  In the U.S. state
and local sample, more than 90 percent of the funds operated under such a rule.
A key incentive to follow these standards is the existence of legal liability for actions that
do not meet the standards. For example,  the prudent person standard would likely not be
met if a trustee made a significant investment decision without making the effort to first
become reasonably  informed about the decision. The trustee in such a situation could be
legally liable for damages resulting from that breach of duty. More likely, however,  is
that pension fund trustees, like corporate directors, will be indemnified by the
organization for any liability resulting from acts taken in good faith. In our intemational
sample, the responses indicated that one-third of the funds did not maintain personal
liability for trustees. For the other two-thirds of the funds, there is no legal liability. The
consequence is that there is less incentive  for the trustees to be vigilant in the
performance of their duties.
Another tool with which to control the behavior of boards is a code of ethics (or conduct).
During the 1980s and 1990s the maintenance of a code of ethics became standard practice
for corporations,  and more than 90 percent of large corporations now have such codes
(Adams et al. 2001). Codes of ethics similarly have become increasingly common among
public pension funds. Among the sample of U.S. state and local pension plans, the
number of plans that used a code of ethics increased from 50 percent to 70 percent in the
period  1992 to 1998.
Codes of ethics are expected to improve the performance of public pension funds. For
trustees, the code cover such issues as conflicts of interest and the acceptance  of
gratuities. It should provide guidance to trustees  and instruct them to avoid practices,
such as the hiring of money managers based on favoritism, that may adversely affect plan
members. Through such provisions it should guide trustees toward decisions based on
prudence rather than personal gain, and this in turn should lead to better overall
performance  for the pension fund. Similar to the prudent person standard, a code of ethics
should act as a control on agency problems. From the international  sample, 52 percent of
the funds have a code of conduct, 48 percent have conflict-of-interest  rules, and 65
percent have one or the other. In New Zealand, trustees follow a code of conduct and are
required to disclose any conflicts of interest they may have (Palacios 2002).
IV.G Information and Transparency
Information is an important and necessary part of behavioral  controls. The trustees need
information to perform their job with vigilance and the key stakeholder groups need
information to hold the trustees accountable.  As Eisenhardt (1989) stated, an agency
perspective allows us to see that information is a commodity that can be purchased.
Information should be provided up to the point where the marginal benefit of the
information disclosure exceeds or equals the marginal cost of producing the information.
As administrative costs can be significant in public pension plans, this is important. The
information disclosed also should include explicit statements on the issues surrounding
performance measures and accountability.
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Information can come from many sources and pertain to many different items. Two key
pieces of information are audits and annual reports. Audits provide the board with the
information  they need to perform their job appropriately and provide the public with the
information they need to evaluate the financial health of the plan. Seventy percent of the
funds in our sample produce an independent external audit on a regular basis. Likewise,
annual reports provide the public with information on the actions of the board and the
performance of the fund. All but one of the funds included in the sample indicated that
they produce an annual report, and approximately half of the funds produce quarterly
reports. In addition, 61 percent use an investment performance  assessment.
To be useful, this information must of course be complete and accurate. In the United
States, corporate securities  laws dictate that management disclose all "material"
information to shareholders  and hold management  liable for producing false information.
In the context of corporate law, material information is that which a reasonable investor
would consider important when making an investment decision.  By law or policy, the
board should specify what information is "material"  for the stakeholders of the public
pension fund. This should ensure that the disclosures provided by most pension funds do
not omit any informnation that stakeholders would find useful.
Other relevant information includes the investment policies of the pension fund (63
percent of the funds in the international sample produce a written investment policy).
Such policies provide the board both with guidance and possibly with performance goals.
In our sample, the following items were included in the investment policy: short-term
target rates of return (32 percent);  long-term target rates of return (59 percent); quantified
asset allocation guidelines (57 percent);  and target measures of risk or volatility of returns
(80 percent).
Included in the investment policy should also be a statement on the use of fund assets for
social goals. As noted by Iglesias and Palacios (2002), most funds  do not have
established criteria for social investments.  In some cases, the fund is prevented by law
from investing in any way other than that which maximizes profit. For funds without such
restrictions, there should be established criteria for when goals other than those pertaining
to the maximizing of value can be taken into consideration. For example, many have
pointed out the potential distortion that large pension funds could cause to smaller capital
markets. Funds could include in their policy the explicit identification of situations where
such social and local economic  issues should be taken into consideration.
V  CONCLUSION
Agency theory has been useful for understanding and improving the governance of
corporations.  Likewise, it should be useful for improving the governance  of public
pension funds. However, just as there is not a one-size-fits-all  governance structure  for
corporations throughout the world, or even within a single country, there is no single
governance  structure that can be universally applied to public pension funds. Different
goals, restrictions, political environments,  and local market conditions; the availability of
competent asset managers; and many other factors will affect the appropriate governance
structure for any pension fund, but it is important that the board recognize potential
agency problems-whether they are based on uncertainty or on potential goal conflicts-
and then utilize the appropriate governance control mechanisms.
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Different asset allocations will require different governance practices,  for example.  Using
our survey results, we compared those funds that allocate more than 10 percent of their
assets to equities with the funds that do not. The funds with more 10 percent of their
portfolio in equities were more likely to provide their trustees with written conflict-of-
interest rules. In addition, these funds operated more transparently:  they were more likely
to have written disclosure rules and more likely to regularly produce independent external
audits and actuarial  reports.
These differences  suggest that funds recognize the potential for agency problems when
investing in equities and the need for governance mechanisms to prevent these problems.
For example, with equity investments there is a greater chance that trustees may purchase
securities from individuals or businesses with which they have financial or political ties.
In response, pension funds may adopt conflict of interest rules to mitigate this problem.
Such rules would be not as necessary if the funds could be invested more heavily in
government bonds.  Interestingly, the funds with more equity investments had
significantly fewer elected trustees.  One possible explanation for this finding is that such
funds favor the appointment of trustees as a means of ensuring that the board has the
expertise necessary to invest in equities.
Overall, developing an understanding of agency theory and the various mechanisms that
can control the agency problems that potentially exist in public pensions would enable
pension fund sponsors to adopt the optimal governance tools at the lowest administrative
cost.
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APPENDIX  A
Public Pension Fund Management Survey
Governance
[1]  Please indicate the number of members who serve at any one time on the governing body (e.g., board
of trustees) of your institution:
[2] Number
[3]  Please indicate the number of members that are ex-officio, appointed,  elected, or other.
[4] Ex-officio_  Appointed_  Elected  Other
[5]  In the case of appointed members,  how many are appointed by each of the following:
[6] Minister of Finance  Head of State  Minister of Labor _  Other
[7]  Please indicate the number of members that represent each of the following groups:
[8]Trade  unions  _  Government as plan sponsor
[9]  Employers associations  of which:
[10]  Other employees association  Ministry of Finance
[11]  Other (specify)  Ministry of Labor
[12]  Ministry of Social Affairs or Health
[13]  Are there expert/professional  members on the board/goveming body?
[14]  Yes  No_
[15]  If  yes,  how many members  of the board/governing  body are in this category? _
[16]  Please indicate the duration of terms for members of the board/goveming  body:
[171  Year(s)  _  Other
[18]  Who chairs the board/governing body?
[19]
[20]  Please indicate the areas in which the board/goveming body has ultimate responsibility:
[21]  - Funding targets  - Investment policy  _  Actuarial assessment
[22]  - Budget formulation  _  Personnel/staffing  _  Selection of management
[23]  Other (please specify)
[24]  Please identify the subcommittees  organized by the governing body to execute its functions and meet
its responsibilities; their objectives; and the number of govemors participating on each subcommittee:
Committee  Objective  Number of members
[25]  Audit committee
[26]  Investment committee
[27]  Governance committee
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[28]  Management committee
[29]  Other (describe)
[30]
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Accountability and Disclosure
[31]  Please indicate which of the following apply to the members of the board/governing  body and exist in
written form:
[32]  - Conflict of interest rules  _  Codes of conduct  Disclosure
rules
[33]  Personal  liability  _  Acceptable cause for dismissal
[34]  Please indicate how often the board/goveming body must report to Congress  or Parliament regarding
the performance  and/or activities of your institution:
[35]
[36]  Please indicate which of the following is produced by the institution on a periodic/regular basis:
[37]  Quarterly reports  _  Annual reports  - Independent external audit
[38]  Actuarial  report  - Investment performance  assessment
[39]  How often does the entire board/governing body convene on a normal basis?
[40]
[41]  Has there been any serious case of fraud or other scandal that resulted in formal investigation in the
last five years?  Yes  No
[42]
Investment Policy/Practice
[43]  What year did the most recent actuarial evaluation of the pension fund take place?
[44]  What were the estimated gross liabilities of the pension fund in that evaluation?
[45]  What was the ratio of assets to liabilities at the time of this actuarial valuation?
[46]  Does the fund have a target funding ratio (i.e.,  ratio of assets to liabilities) and if so, what is the target?
[47]  Yes/No  If yes, target ratio
[48]  What is the total value of the pension fund?
[49]  Amount  Date of valuation
[50]  What is the method of valuation of assets used?
[51]  Marked to market  Book value  Other/combination
[52]  What proportion of the  assets of the pension fund at the time of this valuation fell into each of the
following categories?
[53]  - Govemment bonds  _  Bank deposit  Equities  _  Loans
[54]  - Corporate bonds  _  Real estate  _  Other
[55]  Does the board/governing  body produce a written investment policy?
[56]  Yes  No
[57]  If so, how often are major revisions made?
[58]  At least once a year  Every few years _  _  Only when required
[59]  Does the board/governing  body approve new investments or sales of existing assets above a certain
value, and if so, what is that value?
[60]  Yes  Value  No_
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[61]  Please indicate which of the following items is included in this investment policy?
[62]  Short-term  target rate of return on assets
[63]  Long-term target rate of return on assets
[64]  Quantified asset allocation guidelines
[65]  Target measures of risk or volatility of retums
[66]  Are there explicit mandates for investment in any of the following assets?
[67]  Government bonds  _  State/provincial/municipal  bonds
[68]  _  Social projects (e.g., urban housing)  _  Economic development
[69]  Other (please specify)
[70]  Are there explicit restrictions against investments in any of the following:
[71]  Foreign securities  _  Equities  _  Loans
[72]  Other (please specify)_
[73]  If quantitative investment limits are used, please indicate the minimum/maximum  that apply to the
following assets:
[74]  Security  Minimum  Maximum
[75]  Government bonds
[76]  o/w nontradable
[77]  Corporate  bonds
[78]  Listed shares
[79]  Nonlisted shares
[80]  Mutual funds
[81]  Other (describe)
[82]  Foreign securities
[83]  What was the gross rate of return on all assets of the fund  in 2000  2001
[84]  What proportion of the investment portfolio is managed extemally?
[85]  If extemal asset managers are used, are the criteria for their selection explicit written down?
[86]  Yes  No
[87]  Are independent performance reviews  used on a regular basis? Yes _  No _
[88]  If extemal managers are  used, how often is  their performance subject to review?
[89]
[90]  Is performance  monitored against explicit benchmarks for each type of asset?
[91]  Yes  _  No
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